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in his later works as a break from his earlier views. In this paper, by reading Foucault’s 
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between assujettisement and critique, and the second way is through the notions of 
government and conduct.
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Since his death in 1984, Michel Foucault’s works have been productively used in multiple fields of study, ranging from geography to politics to psychology and education studies. Rather 
than emphasize the particular applicability of his ideas, I would like to 
propose a reading of Foucault’s works that highlights the question of 
the subject and its formation in relation to power relations. A common 
criticism is that his writings on power over-emphasized the effects that 
technologies of power have on the subjection of humans, rendering 
attempts of resistance futile and reducing the subject to a mere passive 
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effect of power. According to this criticism, by exaggerating the 
pervasiveness and intricacy of disciplinary mechanisms and power 
relations, Foucault overlooked – and even considered as an extension 
of the workings of power – individual agency. It has also been argued 
that he had to break away from his earlier ideas on power in order to be 
able to articulate his views on subjectivity and include possibilities of 
resistance to power. Several commentators point towards a break within 
Foucault’s works around the late 1970s and the early 1980s, arguing 
that he was forced to reconsider and weaken his earlier views on 
power so as to ‘make room’ for the subject.1 This reading of Foucault’s 
works distorts his works in such a way that makes them less ethically 
and politically fruitful. It overlooks, moreover, the extent to which 
analytic tools that could refer to the question of the subject, freedom 
and resistance were already available in his works before his explicit 
engagement with ethics. 
Foucault proposed several characterizations of his own work. In an 
interview in 1983, he claimed that his works revolve around three axes: 
the axis of truth, the axis of power, and the axis of ethics.2 Although 
this often fuels the easy categorization of his works into three phases – 
the 1960s corresponding to the archaeological phase, the 1970s to the 
genealogical phase, and the 1980s to the ethical phase – a more fruitful 
engagement with his work requires one to emphasize the interrelations 
between the different axes of his work. Instead of a smooth progression 
from one phase to the other, or from one set of questions to the other, 
Foucault preferred the analogy of the spiral, where one proceeds 
through analyses and returns to the same questions, this time tackled 
through new conceptual apparata. In this way, although the analysis of 
power and knowledge occupied Foucault through the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the analysis of ethics in the 1980s, the two concerns cannot be 
1 See, for example, Nancy Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and 
Normative Confusions’, Praxis International, 3 (1981), 272–87; Jürgen Habermas, The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, 1987), 238–93; Charles Taylor, 
‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy 
(Oxford, 1986), 69–102; Michael Walzer, ‘The Politics of Michel Foucault’, in Foucault: A 
Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford, 1986), 51–68; Peter Dews, ‘The Return 
of the Subject in Late Foucault’, Radical Philosophy, 51 (1989), 37–41.
2 See Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 1, ed. Paul 
Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York, 1997), 262–3.
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radically distinguished. It is this distinction and separation that fuels the 
several criticisms of his work, especially those related to the question 
of the subject. Moreover, by focusing solely on Foucault’s published 
books, the claim that a break marks his works in the 1970s and 1980s 
is more understandable, but it is less so if his books are read alongside 
the annual lecture courses he delivered at the Collège De France, which 
offer further contextual depth to his books and are especially important 
in light of understanding his move from power/knowledge to ethics 
without seeing this as a drastic shift. 
Although Foucault’s name is immediately associated with the notion 
of power, he discouraged a reading of his work that foregrounded this 
notion. As he claimed in yet another self-characterization in ‘The 
Subject and Power’, it is the notion of the subject and its formation that 
is the goal of his work.3 Although such self-characterizations should 
not be accepted uncritically, placing the question of the subject at the 
heart of Foucault’s works is a plausible position which can be argued 
for. The question of the subject is a multi-faceted one associated with 
questions of resistance, freedom, agency, and critique, and is particularly 
extrapolated in works within critical theory and feminist thought. In 
some form or another, all the critics mentioned refer to this question 
within Foucault’s works, particularly his ideas on the relation between 
power and subjectivity, or on the grounds upon which certain exercises 
of power and domination can be criticized and resisted if the values of 
truth and freedom are undermined. This paper will propose two ways 
through which the question of the subject can be productively raised 
and located throughout his works, even within his concerns with power 
relations. The first way is through the relation between assujettisement 
and critique, and the second way is through the notions of government 
and conduct. 
Assujettisement and Critique
In ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault admitted that although his 
concern was with processes through which human subjects are created 
3 See Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1983), 208.
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– processes of subjectification – the question of power seemed to be 
prioritized in his writings. The reason he identified for this was that a more 
adequate account of processes that objectify the subject necessitated a 
better account of power relations. In this essay, he directly considered 
the question of how power and struggles against it relate to the question 
of subject-formation. Foucault claimed that power struggles ‘question 
the status of the individual: […] they attack everything which separates 
the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, 
forces the individual back on himself and ties him to his own identity in 
a constraining way’.4 Hence, the main question is that of identity – of 
‘who we are’ – and the refusal to be defined by such procedures and 
techniques of power/knowledge. This echoes his claims in Discipline 
and Punish that his interest was in how an individual is made subject, 
identified, categorized, interpreted and understood. One, therefore, 
cannot maintain that power/knowledge is besides the concern with 
the question of the subject. The productivity of the power/knowledge 
matrix applies not only to fields of knowledge or domains of objects 
but, especially, to the creation of individual subjects.  
When Foucault spoke of the term ‘subject’, he often referred to its 
dual meaning and emphasized that ‘[t]here are two meanings of the 
word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, 
and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both 
meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject 
to’.5 It is useful to look closer at what can be regarded as a mere matter 
of translation but which, nonetheless, has an important theoretical 
import. The French word Foucault used which is generally translated as 
subjection or subjugation is assujettisement. Alan Milchman and Alan 
Rosenberg maintain that besides the negative and passive connotations of 
translating assujettissement as subjection or subjugation (and sometimes 
as subjectification), there is also a realm of autonomy and possibility of 
resistance implied by Foucault.6 They argue that this active connotation 
of assujettissement becomes especially important when Foucault went 
beyond his account of disciplinary power in order to conceive of power 
in terms of governmentality, which will be discussed below. 
4 Ibid., 211–2.
5 Ibid., 212.
6 See Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, ‘The Aesthetic and Ascetic Dimensions of an 
Ethics of Self-Fashioning: Nietzsche and Foucault’, Parrhesia, Vol. 2 (2007), 55.  
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Furthermore, this notion of assujettisement has been thoroughly 
examined in feminist critical theory and gender studies, enabling a 
fruitful engagement with Foucault’s ideas, both in the applications of 
and contentions to these ideas. Amy Allen, for example, dwells further 
on this question of the subject within feminist theory and argues that ‘the 
most important insight of Foucault’s analysis of power is its emphasis 
on the interplay between constraint and enablement that is central to 
his account of subjection’.7 Allen writes that ‘subjection involves being 
subjected to power relations but this process produces subjects who are 
capable of action and even of autonomy,’8 where autonomy, she adds, 
is understood as the capacities for critical reflection and deliberate self-
transformation. Although, according to Foucault, this possible activity 
too would be imbued with power relations, this need not amount to 
subscribing to the overly-pessimistic conclusion that the subject is 
completely socially constructed and determined by power relations. 
Social construction need not be understood as absolute determination. 
Acknowledging this interplay avoids interpreting Foucault’s ideas as 
implying a helpless and passive subject, showing that this criticism 
directed towards his ideas rests upon an incomplete reading of his 
works. Although it is true that after the publication of The Will to 
Knowledge in 1976 there were important changes in his work, these 
are not radical changes that annul his previous works but are fruitful 
expansions which complement his ideas on power with a consideration 
of ethics and subjectivity.9
Alongside a closer look at the notion of assujettisement, it is important 
to consider Foucault’s views on critique to observe how his engagement 
with the question of the subject goes beyond the characterization of 
the subject as a passive effect of power. In ‘What is Critique?’, he 
maintained that critique is characterized by dispersion, and defined 
critique as ‘an instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not 
know nor happen to be, it oversees a domain it would want to police 
and is unable to regulate’.10 Crucially, Foucault identified the realm 
7 Amy Allen, ‘Feminism and the Subject of Politics,’ in New Waves in Political Theory, ed. 
Boudewijn de Bruin and Christopher Zurn (London, 2009), 4.
8 Ibid., 5.
9 See Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary 
Critical Theory (New York, 2008), 23.
10 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, in The Politics of Truth, eds. Sylvère Lotringer and 
Lysa Hochroth (New York, 1997), 25.
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of critique as that which brings together the multiple relationships 
between power, truth and the subject. It is in this sense that genealogical 
critique entails the question of the subject, besides power/knowledge. 
In associating critique with ‘the art of not being governed quite so 
much,’11 the possibility of resistance and freedom by the subject is 
implied. Hence in this 1978 lecture, prior to his exploration of an ethics 
of the self and freedom, Foucault was able to speak of the subject’s field 
of possible action: ‘I will say that critique is the movement by which the 
subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power 
and question power on its discourses of truth’.12
Judith Butler takes her cue from Foucault’s 1978 lecture and 
considers the question of the relation between critique and the subject. 
Butler maintains that ‘[p]aradoxically, self-making and desubjugation 
happen simultaneously when a mode of existence is risked which is 
unsupported by what he calls the regime of truth’.13 Responding to 
commentators who claim that Foucault’s works are void of any critical 
and normative content, Butler argues that this finitude in terms of lack 
of support provides the Foucaultian notion of critique with normative 
commitments which, however, cannot be fit into and understood 
within the current vocabulary of normativity. This does not mean that 
normativity, for Foucault, is just a matter of decision or preference, 
but rather is a lived critique, a practised critique of questioning that 
which is taken as fixed. This is not done in the spirit of unnecessary 
amoral transgression but, as Butler says, ‘because one has already run 
up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives’.14 
This is why the risk of critique as destabilizing regularized parameters 
is likened, by Foucault and Butler, to the risking of one’s stability and 
the hardship associated with the cultivation of a virtuous character. This 
virtue is not based upon a set of objective or clearly articulated laws, 
so the kind of critique Foucault is able to undertake will not follow a 
prescriptive or juridical model. Butler argues that such models do not 
suffice for Foucault and this makes the lack of clear normativity in his 
notion of critique problematic. The difficulty arises because through 
11 Ibid., 29.
12 Ibid., 32.
13 Judith Butler, ‘What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue’, in The Judith Butler 
Reader, eds. Sara Salih and Judith Butler (Oxford, 2004), 306.
14 Ibid., 307–8.
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adopting a prescriptive model, certainty and stability is sought, yet 
the notions of certainty and stability themselves disable the critical 
task of interrogating rules and judgements operated by oneself and 
operating within society. In ‘What is Critique?’, Foucault remarked that 
in critique, liberty is at stake. Butler picks upon this point and argues 
that ‘liberty emerges at the limits of what one can know, at the very 
moment in which the desubjugation of the subject within the politics of 
truth takes place’.15 Apart from the transgressive or aesthetic features 
generally associated with this image of critique, one needs to recognize 
the risks inherent in such a practice and the difficulty of such work. 
This risky virtue which, for Butler, must be fulfilled through thought 
and language involves pushing the present ordering of things to the 
limits, highlighting how the stakes of genealogical critique intertwine 
with the question of subject-formation, pointing less towards a break 
within Foucault’s works and more towards fruitful expansions in his 
notions of power and subjectivity.
Governmentality, Counter-conduct, Freedom
Another way of analysing the relation between Foucault’s ideas on 
power/knowledge and the subject is by considering the expansion of 
his ideas on power into biopower and governmentality. In the final 
chapter of The Will to Knowledge, Foucault introduced the concept of 
biopower or power over life. He argued that the idea of a sovereign 
power, defined through a right of seizure of life, was transformed into 
a power over life where life itself becomes the concern of politics. 
As he put it, ‘the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced 
by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’.16 From 
the seventeenth century onwards, Foucault maintained, biopower 
developed around two poles: ‘an anatomo-politics of the human body 
[… and] a biopolitics of the population’.17 The first pole incorporates 
disciplinary power and so does not mark any significant addition to his 
account of power in Discipline and Punish. What is innovative in his 
15 Ibid., 315.
16 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, trans. Robert 
Hurley (London, 1998 [1976]), 138 (emphasis in original).
17 Ibid., 139 (emphasis in original).
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thinking is his discussion of the second pole around which biopower 
developed, characterized by the use of regulatory controls as tools for 
employing this kind of power upon a population. This can be further 
appreciated by considering Foucault’s 1977-78 lecture course at the 
Collège De France, Security, Territory, Population, where he analysed 
security as a further modality of power, arguing that power does not 
simply function through the exercise of sovereignty over individuals, 
neither solely through disciplinary mechanisms employed through 
surveillance of individuals, but that the modality of power particular to 
the mechanisms of security is the government of populations. 
Foucault considered government as an economy of power and turned 
to literature concerning government in order to grasp the historical roots 
of its meaning. He noted that in Greco-Roman antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, there were ample treatises written to advise the ruler on how 
to conduct oneself and how to exercise power whilst maintaining the 
respect of the ruled. However, he observed that between the sixteenth 
and the eighteenth century, a general problematic of government 
appears and such treatises were presented not just as advice but as 
arts of government. The term ‘government’ has a broad sense in this 
context; it includes multiple issues such as the ‘government of oneself, 
[...] the government of souls and of conduct, [...] the government of 
children, [...] the government of the state by the prince’.18 Foucault 
showed that with this broad definition, it is not just territory that is the 
object of government but also human relationships, wealth, resources, 
and epidemics. Moreover, the governor is not presented as a powerful 
entity ready to assert its might if necessary, but as the possessor of 
wisdom and knowledge of how to manage things accordingly. This 
idea of possessing the appropriate knowledge in order to govern is an 
important one especially in relation to the later development of forms 
of knowledge pertaining to the state – statistics – quantifying the 
dimensions and strength of the state or rationalizing the exercise of the 
state’s power or its increase.19 
Foucault maintained that the three movements of government, 
population, and political economy have been solidified as a series in the 
eighteenth century and still remains present today. Hence, this concern 
18 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France 1977–
1978, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York, 2009), 88.
19 See ibid., 100–1.
9ConduCting Critique: reConsidering FouCault’s engagement 
with government is explained by his claim that what he wished to 
undertake is a history of governmentality through which the present can 
be engaged with and understood. As can be appreciated from his own 
attempt at defining it, governmentality includes widespread processes 
and deployments.20 It entails the complex (or apparatus) formed 
by institutions and procedures that enables the exercise of a kind of 
power which has the population as its target, political economy as its 
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument. Moreover, governmentality refers to the historical 
developments that constantly led towards governing as a mode of 
power to take precedence over other types of power such as sovereignty 
and discipline. This process resulted in the governmentalization of 
the modern state from the state of justice in the Middle Ages and the 
administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Through 
genealogical critique, Foucault traced the historical roots of the 
rationality underlining governmentality by considering pastoral power 
and seventeenth century theories of the reason of the state (raison 
d’état) as a prelude to modern governmentality. 
It is relevant to outline the general features of pastoral power 
Foucault highlighted in order to link these with the discussion of the 
relation between power/knowledge and the subject.21 Pastoral power – 
the power of the shepherd – is exercised over a moving flock and not 
over a territory. It is a type of power defined in terms of beneficence 
rather than omnipotence. Hence, it is the well-being of the flock 
and its salvation that is the objective of this type of power. Pastoral 
power is, thus, not conceived as the ability of the powerful to exhibit 
strength and dominion over the powerless, but as the shepherd’s dutiful 
application of care towards the flock in an attempt to safeguard its every 
member. Pastoral power is an individualizing power since the shepherd 
singles out and gives attention to every sheep. Furthermore, through 
the pastoral type of power, Foucault identified a particular relationship 
which was developed between the subject and truth. He maintained that 
the obligation of the Christian pastor to teach rested upon a particular 
conception of teaching which integrated the direction of daily conduct 
and spiritual direction. As a result, the pastor’s teaching is not one-
20 See ibid., 108–9.
21 See ibid., 124–8.
10
SympoSia melitenSia Number 11 (2015) 
dimensional or of a general kind but is specific to the individual. This 
takes the form of an exhaustive observation of the life of the individual 
and a meticulous supervision of behaviour. Foucault contrasted the 
form of spiritual direction in Greco-Roman antiquity with this form 
of spiritual direction specific to the Christian pastorate. He noted that 
in antiquity, an individual sought a spiritual director in exceptional 
circumstances such as when one was going through a bad time. Hence, 
‘spiritual direction was voluntary, episodic, consolatory, and at certain 
times it took place through the examination of conscience’.22 Therefore, 
this form of spiritual direction had an objective – the self-mastery of 
the individual who sought the spiritual direction – and was not done 
for its own sake. Within the Christian pastorate, spiritual direction took 
a different form because it was no longer perceived as a voluntary, 
circumstantial and goal-oriented activity but served the purpose of 
developing a particular discourse of the truth about the self through 
the examination of conscience. This truth is, in turn, extracted from 
the individual, binding the individual to the spiritual director, further 
marking the relationship of subordination to the other.
This analysis of pastoral power in relation to governmentality 
enabled Foucault to dwell upon the notion of conduct. He explicitly 
exploited the semantic flexibility of the term ‘conduct’ and defined it 
in this way:
[T]he word ‘conduct’ refers to two things. Conduct is the activity of conducting 
(conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like, but it is equally the way in which 
one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself be conducted (se laisse conduire), is 
conducted (est conduit), and finally, in which one behaves (se comporter) as an effect 
of a form of conduct (une conduite) as the action of conducting or of conduction 
(conduction).23 
This notion plays an important role in the consideration of Foucault’s 
engagement with the question of subject-formation in relation to power, 
and to what extent can agency and resistance be theorized within his 
works. He identified forms of resistance that emerged from within the 
pastorate itself as specific revolts of conduct whose aims were to be 
22 Ibid., 182.
23 Ibid., 193.
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conducted differently, by other leaders, objectives, and procedures, or 
not to be conducted by others so as to be able to conduct themselves. 
These included asceticism, which Foucault argued is incompatible 
with complete subordination of the individual since asceticism aims 
towards self-mastery and indifference to temptation; the formation of 
new religious communities stemming from doctrinal and hierarchical 
disagreements; mysticism, due to its avoidance of the hierarchy of 
the church and its mistrust of confession; and possible readings of 
scripture and certain eschatological beliefs which relegate the pastorate 
and its interventions to the background.24 Before settling for counter-
conduct, Foucault considered a number of terms to suitably describe 
the sense of such practices. In explaining Foucault’s choice of words, 
Arnold I. Davidson truly captures the importance that the notion of 
counter-conduct has in understanding Foucault’s move from politics to 
ethics, or from power relations to technologies of the self, by carefully 
articulating the various interrelations between them:
Foucault’s problem of vocabulary, his attempt to find a specific word to designate the 
resistances, refusals, revolts against being conducted in a certain way, show how careful 
he was in wanting to find a concept that neglected neither the ethical nor the political 
dimensions and that made it possible to recognize their nexus. After rejecting the 
notions of ‘revolt,’ ‘disobedience,’ ‘insubordination,’ ‘dissidence,’ and ‘misconduct,’ 
for reasons ranging from their being notions that are either too strong, too weak, too 
localized, too passive, or too substance-like, Foucault proposes the expression ‘counter-
conduct’.25
 
An appreciation of the multiple dimensions of conduct regards 
both the political setting of the notion of conduct as well as the ethical 
component within movements of resistance. The link between ethics 
and government through the notion of conduct can also be seen in The 
Subject and Power, where Foucault claims that ‘to “conduct” is at the 
same time to “lead” others [...] and a way of behaving within a more or 
less open field of possibilities’.26 
24 See ibid., 205–14.
25 Arnold I. Davidson, introduction to Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at 
the Collège De France 1977–1978, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New 
York, 2009), xxi–xxii.
26 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, 220–1.                                                                                       
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In several ways, through an analysis of the notion of conduct, one can 
see an aspect of Foucault’s discussion of governmentality in relation to 
the question of the subject as a prelude to his later writings on ethics. 
Firstly, he claimed that the mode of rationality underpinning the modern 
state is ‘a factor for individualization and a totalitarian principle’.27 
The totalizing aspect is what makes the state be perceived as a ‘cold 
monster’, where any attempt of resistance is considered to be futile. The 
individualizing aspect, on the other hand, concerns the ways in which 
subjects are created through modes of individualization. This conception 
of power led him to develop an understanding of resistance that draws on 
the relationship between the self and truth. This refers to the constitution 
and reconstitution of the subject in political engagement, which is what 
Foucault’s conception of critique rests on. This conception of resistance 
is far from representing a humanistic understanding of liberation as being 
totally opposed to power and ever closer to a truth. Foucault’s notion 
of critique, therefore, depends on a personal and political contestation 
of a truth through which the self is defined.28 Secondly, a link between 
government and the question of the subject can be seen by considering 
the modes of individualization inherent to pastoral power. Of paramount 
importance is the process of subjectivation, a process whereby the subject 
is created by ascribing to itself a specific truth. Foucault elaborated this 
further in his analysis of sexuality and confessional technology in The 
Will to Knowledge and, later, in his discussion of the hermeneutics of the 
self. What is at stake in the analysis of subjectivation is the relationship 
of the self to itself, which is, precisely, the starting point of Foucault’s 
discussion of ethics. As he realized, an analysis of this relationship must be 
understood in relation to technologies of the self and not just technologies 
of power. Consequently, the move towards a consideration of subjectivity 
and the grounding of ethics in the freedom of the individual in Foucault’s 
later works cannot be separated from his continuous concern with the 
inescapability of power relations. Lois McNay makes a similar point 
when referring to his discussion of freedom and autonomy, and argues 
that:
27 Michel Foucault, ‘“Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in 
Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Colin 
Gordon et al. (London, 2000), 325.
28 See Ben Golder, ‘Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power’, Radical Philosophy 
Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2007), 175.
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some commentators have taken this as a sign of defeat in that the thinker who once 
proclaimed the death of the subject finishes by restoring the free individual in what 
appears to be a retreat to a form of neoliberal thought. The use of such concepts signals 
an important shift in Foucault’s work, but this should not be seen as a retraction of 
previous thought; rather it is a rethinking of the relation between his work and 
Enlightenment thought in general.29
Therefore, in the same way that overlooking the development of 
Foucault’s later ideas on ethics would constitute an incomplete reading 
of his earlier ideas on power and governmentality, his later ideas on 
ethics cannot be understood without considering his earlier ideas on 
power. 
In fact, through the notion of government, in one of his last interviews 
in 1984, Foucault reconsidered and distinguished between different forms 
of power relations. In order to counter the intuitive claim that power is 
intrinsically bad and dominating, he maintained that power is not evil. He 
argued that ‘we must distinguish between power relations understood as 
strategic games between liberties [...] and the states of domination that 
people ordinarily call “power”’.30 Foucault claimed that when humans relate 
to each other, in ‘verbal communications [...], or amorous, institutional, or 
economic relationships, power is always present: I mean a relationship in 
which one person tries to control the conduct of the other’.31 He emphasized 
that such power relations are unstable and can be continuously reversed, 
and so power relations are only possible on the condition that there are free 
subjects. This explains his claim that there can be no power – understood 
in this way – without the possibility of resistance. Contrary to what is 
sometimes implied, Foucault did not put forward the view that owing to the 
pervasiveness of power relations, all possibilities of freedom are prevented. 
Rather, he claimed that the existence of relations of power themselves imply 
the possibility of freedom. This view should not be interpreted as excluding 
states of domination. Such states do exist and Foucault described them as 
states where power relations are fixed as asymmetrical, greatly limiting 
the margin of freedom. This approach to Foucault’s engagement with the 
29 Lois McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, 1994), 129.
30 Michel Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom’, in Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, 
trans. Robert Hurley et al., Vol. 1 (New York, 1997), 299.
31 Ibid., 292.
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question of the subject, both in his later conceptualization of ethics and in 
his earlier analyses of power relations and governmentality, does not point 
towards a radical break within his works. As he put it in a late interview: 
I am saying that ‘governmentality’ implies the relationship of the self to itself, and 
I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that 
constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their 
freedom can use in dealing with each other. [...] Thus, the basis for all this is freedom, 
the relationship of the self to itself and the relationship to the other. [...] I believe that 
the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject 
and its relationship to others – which constitutes the very stuff [matière] of ethics.32
The focus on the active self-constitution of the subject through 
practices of the self in Foucault’s later works does not imply that these 
practices are freely invented by the subject outside the realm of power 
relations. He acknowledged that these are models one discovers in the 
culture in which one lives and are, thus, imposed upon the subject, 
distancing his views from Sartre’s existentialist notion of authenticity, 
and placing his views closer to Nietzsche’s ideas on self-creation.33
Conclusion: The Ethos of Critique 
In ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault referred to Kant’s invocation 
to dare to know (sapere aude) as a task that implies risk and courage 
within an attitude which analyses the present as a particular moment in 
history. Foucault sought to show that the Enlightenment is less about 
being faithful to a set of doctrines or the kernels of rationality, and 
more about the ‘the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is, of 
a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique 
of our historical era’.34 He maintained that the task nowadays is to 
investigate the present limits of what is considered as necessary in the 
constitution of subjects. Through this limit-attitude one investigates 
32 Ibid., 300.
33 See Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, 262. 
34 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential 
Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New 
York, 1997), 312.
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the place occupied by the singular, the contingent and the arbitrary in 
what is given as universal. It is an attitude that seeks to move beyond 
analyses grounded in transcendental categories or universal structures 
of possible knowledge or moral action, and instead analyses present 
discourses as historical events, thereby highlighting ‘the possibility of 
no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’.35 This 
critique or historico-critical attitude is experimental – it opens up new 
fields of inquiry, points to possibilities of change, and gives form to 
what he called the undefined work of freedom. Foucault embodied this 
attitude in his studies of the different modes in which a historically 
recurring body of practices and issues such as insanity, health, crime and 
sexual relationships are problematized in particular historical periods. 
Foucault’s engagement with the question of the subject highlights 
the multiple connected facets of his philosophical work. It shows how 
his move from power/knowledge to ethics and the self is not a break 
that implies a passive and constituted subject in his earlier works and 
an active self-constituting agent in his later works. As I have argued, 
this discontinuous conception of Foucault’s philosophical project can 
be countered by approaching his engagement with the question of the 
subject through the notions of assujettisement, critique, governmentality 
and conduct. Such an approach is also central to understanding his ideas 
on power, ethics and the relation between the two. These interesting and 
important relations entail different mechanisms and techniques through 
which identities are negotiated and human subjects are rendered 
intelligible. This complex process is not a harmonious one but involves 
a continuous struggle between power, subjectivity and freedom; an 
uneasy and unpredictable balance which shifts throughout history. 
Following Foucault, one can see that this task has both a political and 
an ethical bearing since although subjects cannot rid themselves of the 
historically given – indeed, it is that against which they themselves and 
anything else is made intelligible – individuals have the capacity to 
re-make, re-mould and analyse these formations in order to highlight 
their lack of fixity and their uncanny nature so as to enable new forms 
of subjectivity, new forms of power relations and new forms of truth to 
exist. It is an exercise of thought but also a practice of living.
35 Ibid., 315–6.
